Funding Breakthrough Technology

Case summary: Liquid Crystal Displays

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This case summary is part of the ‘Funding Breakthrough Technology’ project. This project is in the commercialisation stream of activities of the EPSRC funded Cambridge Integrated Knowledge Centre (CIKC) in photonics and macro molecular material. Historical case studies of eight breakthrough technologies of the last 60 years are being investigated with the specific focus of how these technologies were supported and finance in their journey from the lab to market. The other case studies are Light emitting diodes (LEDs), Photovoltaics, Inkjet printing, Fibre optic communications, Giant Magnetoresistance (GMR), Micro electronic mechanical systems (MEMS) and Computed Tomography (CT) and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI).

All of the case study documents are works in progress. If you would like to comment on any of the case study summaries please contact Dr. Samantha Sharpe at the Centre for Business Research on email (s.sharpe@cbr.cam.ac.uk) or telephone (+44 (0) 1223 765 333. As these documents are works in progress we would request that the case studies not be cited without the author’s permission.
Liquid Crystal Display technology

The Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) industry is an US$85billion industry (Hart 2008). LCDs have become the dominant display technology, surpassing plasma and light emitting diodes in modern electronic displays. Sales of LCD TVs overtook worldwide sales of cathode ray tube (CRT) TVs in 2007. LCDs account for 95% of all flat panel display (FPD) sales and thin-film transistor LCDs (TFT-LCD) account for 90% of these sales (Hart 2008).

The industry began in the 1960s in the corporate R&D laboratories of some of the US’ leading corporations – including RCA, Westinghouse and General Electric, before rapidly transferring to Japan and companies such as Sharp, Canon and Seiko. LCD production then shifted, initially in search of lower manufacturing costs, and then because of the sophisticated fabrication investment required for LCD production, to South Korea, Taiwan, and increasingly in China. In 1996 over 95% of all TFT LCD production was made in Japan, but ten years later in 2005 Japan accounted for 11% of production, with South Korea and Taiwan producing approx 40% of the total global market each (Hart 2008).

To gain an overall picture of this global movement, and also the evolution of the industry Chart 1 shows the global distribution of US granted patents in the technology class 349 (Liquid Crystal Cells, Elements and Systems) from 1969-2007. The first patent was granted in 1967 to RCA in the USA. Further patents to RCA, Westinghouse and IBM followed in 1970, with the early years of the LCD technology evolution progress confined to the USA.

Although the US played a prominent role in these early years, as signified by the patents, the field of Liquid Crystal research was an international one, by 1977, ten years after the first patent was granted to RCA, half of all patents granted by the US patent office were to foreign applicants.

This international distribution and contribution of individual countries by year is shown in Chart 2. Japanese activity starts in the early 1970s coinciding with the launch of the first LCD applications – the pocket calculator and then a few years later the digital watch. UK and European activity is also

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evident in the 1970s. Japanese activity continues to strengthen throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, whilst US activity decreased in terms of overall patenting numbers, there is a clear shift in the knowledge base of the technology to Asia. This is reinforced with the increasing activity of South Korea and Taiwan in the last decade or so.

Chart 1 – US patents granted in Liquid Crystals (class 349) by country (1st inventor) by year

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3 The focus of much European work, particularly in the UK, was on developing effective liquid crystal materials. European firms have dominated the international market for basic LC materials Imakita, J. (1981). "A comparative market survey of liquid crystal displays: the United States, Japan and Europe." Displays October: 331-336.
The discovery of liquid crystals

The participation of a number of countries in LCD research and development reflects the international basis for the development of the science behind LCD. Liquid crystals were first discovered by a Czech scientist in 1888. Friedrich Reinitzer was working at the Institute of Plant Physiology at the University of Prague. He was conducting work on the cholesterol of carrots and found the material appeared to have two melting points, one at 145.5°C, where the solid melted into a cloudy liquid, and then at 178.5°C when the cloudiness disappeared to give way to a clear and transparent liquid.

Reinitzer’s friend and physicist Otto Lehmann from the Technical University of Karlsruhe coined the term ‘Flussige Krystalle’ or ‘Liquid Crystals’ on noticing that the cloudy liquid had some properties of a solid crystal (regular structure of the crystals) and others of a liquid (no set shape). A French scientist Charles Mauguin first theorised the twisted nematic (TN) liquid crystal structure in 1911.

The TN structure formed the basis of liquid crystal technology and its application to displays, but this was a connection that would not be made for another sixty years. Liquid crystals continued to be
researched for the next few decades in universities throughout Europe, but when no useful application could be found for the materials, their popularity waned to such extent that by the post WWII period LC research was virtually non-existent (Johnstone 1999).

**Linking the science to applications**

Two critical publications marked the beginning of the resurgence of liquid crystal research. In 1958 Glenn Brown⁴, an American chemist published an article in *Chemical Reviews* on the liquid crystal phase and subsequently sparked international interest in liquid crystal research. Shortly afterwards a leading scholar in liquid crystal research during this period, Prof George Gray of the University of Hull⁵ published a book on liquid crystals. It was an attempt to bolster interest in the field that Gray authored the first book in English on liquid crystals in 1962 called *Molecular Structure and the Properties of Liquid Crystals*. This book had the affect of codifying much of the scientific knowledge around liquid crystals and communicating the field to an audience beyond organic chemistry. As Joe Castellano⁶ noted “...before its publication students of organic chemistry at most US universities did not know what a liquid crystal was” (Johnstone 1999, p.95).

Both Brown’s and Gray’s publications meant that when potential applications for liquid crystal materials in displays began to emerge in strength in the late 1960s researchers had ready access to the ‘start of the field’ information.

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⁴ Born in Logan, Ohio, on September 10, 1915, Glenn received his BS (1939) at Ohio University, his MIS (1941) at Ohio State University and his PhD (1951) at Iowa State University. He taught Chemistry as an instructor at the University of Mississippi (1941-1942) and as an assistant professor at the University of Vermont (1950-1952). He then moved to the University of Cincinnati where he was promoted to associate professor and taught Chemistry (1952-1960). In 1960, he came to Kent State University as a professor to head the Chemistry Department where he successfully built a PhD program. He served as Chairman from 1960-1965, as Dean of Research from 1963-1968, and Director of the Liquid Crystal Institute from 1965-1983. He became Kent’s only Regent’s Professor in 1968 (Neubert 1995)

⁵ George Gray started researching liquid crystals in 1947 as a lecturer at Hull University. He went on to receive his PhD from the University of London in 1953. He returned to Hull after completing his PhD and continued to research liquid crystals, writing *book title* in 1962 and working with the MoD from 1970 onwards (Kawamoto 2002).

⁶ Joe Castellano was a chemist at RCA in the period 1966-1975. He was part of the initial RCA team that completed early research of LCDs and their initial application in electronic calculators and watches. He went on to found a LCD start-up and an LCD technology consultancy. He authored the book *Liquid Gold the story of an industry in 2003*. 
RCA and the discovery of LCD

At the same time as Gray’s book was being published one researcher at RCA laboratories\(^7\) (later known as the Sarnoff Centre after General Manager David Sarnoff) in Princeton, Richard Williams, began experimenting with liquid crystals and their electro-optical properties. RCA had a keen focus on television technology (having developed television in 1939 and colour television in 1953), and a long standing ambition to create a ‘TV on the wall’. Williams was quoted by Johnstone (1999, p.95) “…the idea that there should be a flat display and that that would be a good idea was not a discovery, it was something that was obvious to anyone working at Sarnoff. The question was could anyone make one work?”

Williams’ domain

Williams’ experiments showed that the electro-optic characteristics of liquid crystals could generate an effect (stripe patterns) when voltage was applied. This effect was caused by electro-hydrodynamic instability forming in the liquid crystals – the effect came to be known as ‘Williams’ domain’. Williams posited that these effects could be used to create electrically operated displays, and wrote up his research and applied for a patent. The research was not published until 1963, and the patent granted in 1967. Shortly after the patent application was lodged Richard Williams left RCA New Jersey to take up a sabbatical at RCA’s Swiss research facility. It was when he was in Switzerland that he was invited to give a presentation on liquid crystals to Swiss Watch Institute in Geneva (Johnstone 1999). This link to Switzerland would be reinforced by later Swiss work on liquid crystal displays, particularly with watch applications in mind.

R&D labs

“During these golden years of the 1950’s and 1960’s, both labs (GE and Westinghouse) did very good basic research. Just as good, if not better than, their researchers like to think, than of any university” (Johnstone 1999, p.98)

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\(^7\) RCA – Radio Corporation of America was founded in 1919 by General Electric (GE) as a publicly held company with GE as the controlling shareholder. The company was formed to create a monopoly on radio technology in the US through government support and navy radio assets, the purchase of the US operations of UK based Marconi Wireless and cooperation from AT&T, United Fruit and Westinghouse in pooling their patents in radio technology Aitken, H. (1985). The continuous wave: Technology and American Radio 1900-1932, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.. The end result was government created monopolies in radio for GE and Westinghouse and telephone for AT&T. RCA Laboratories was established in 1941 in Princeton, New Jersey. Technologies such as colour television, the electron microscope, CMOS based technology, video cassette recorders and LCDs
The industrial research and development of the US in the post WWII period was a watermark period in the history of micro electronics – during this period the semiconductor was created along with host of other micro-electronic developments that were the predecessors of many of technologies that are ubiquitous to us today. The major labs were AT&T’s Bell Labs (“undisputedly top of the ladder” (Johnstone 1999), RCA’s Sarnoff centre, and the R&D labs of major corporate such as Westinghouse, General Electric (GE), Texas Instruments and International Business Machines (IBM).

Interdisciplinary research was also a new concept. Until the early 1950s R&D had usually progressed through fields of research, rather than interdisciplinary teams. The Manhattan project (US effort to develop and build the first nuclear weapons during the second world war) has been referred to as “the first time that physicists, chemists and engineers worked together for a common goal” (Castellano 2003, p.9). The early stages of LCD research also benefited from this interdisciplinary interactivity between organic chemists, physicists and electrical engineering (Heilmeier 1976).

**Guest-Host and the dynamic scattering mode (DSM)**

A young scientist at RCA, George Heilmeier⁸, seeking to work on something big⁹ switched from solid state microwaves to the field of organic semi-conductivity (Heilmeier 1976). Heilmeier continued research into William’s work and completed further experiment in ‘doping’ the liquid crystals with dichotic dye. This ‘doping’ enabled with the application of voltage, immediate and dramatic cell changes on a display. This is known as the Guest-Host-Effect.

The Guest-Host effect was imperfect. The liquid crystals and the dyes were not stable over long periods of time; they were sensitive to surface effects and required heating to maintain the nematic state (Kawamoto 2002). This led to two avenues of further work at RCA. Firstly in applying a field-effect that was effective in reflecting light, the Dynamic Scattering mode (DSM) being the end product. Secondly in producing more stable, room-temperature liquid crystal materials (organic compounds referred to as Schiff’s bases were the most effective), which was also achieved by RCA.

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⁸ George Heilmeier completed his PhD at Princeton University 1961 while working at RCA Laboratories. Heilmeier left RCA in 1970 to become a White House Fellow, becoming a special assistant to Secretary of Defence, then in 1975 running DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency) and then CTO for Texas Instruments in 1983.

⁹ Heilmeier was described as an ambitious, young scientist, “…unlike Williams, who was something of a loner, Heilmeier was out to make a name for himself beyond scientific circles” (Johnstone 1999.p: 97). He moved into research on Liquid Crystals after working in solid-state microwave devices, looking for a more ‘fascinating and risky’ (Kawamoto 2002.p:465) field of research and attracted to the experiments of Richard Williams.
scientists. This allowed the first LCD prototypes to be created; an electronic clock, LC cockpit display and liquid crystal readout display (Kawamoto 2002).

Heilmeier was quoted discussing his discovery “You take two pieces of glass with a transparent conductive coating on them and you put the liquid crystal between the two pieces of glass, with a thickness of, say, 25 microns. Then you apply an electric field, and lo and behold: very interesting things happen,” he says, "I thought 'This might make this a very interesting display device.' By golly, you could change colours with a relatively low voltage - which would suggest that integrated circuits could do the addressing" (Metz 2009).

A prototype device was built and tested and displayed to RCA senior management. Management deemed the LC research to be confidential and therefore no more publications were to be written on the research or discussions to take place with external parties by the RCA scientists until 1968, when RCA launched liquid crystal displays to the worldwide media.

“When RCA announced, the world listened. The corporation was famous for its great leaps forward. There had been the television itself, unveiled by David Sarnoff at the 1939 World Fair in New York. Fifteen years later came the colour TV, launched in 1953 with a media blitz that included enormous print advertisements and lavish special broadcasts on RCA’s own network NBC....on the 28th May 1968 some fifty reporters, photographers and network camera crews crowded into the conference room in the RCA building at 30 Rockefeller Plaza to behold the unveiling of the television of the future” (Johnstone 1999:p8)

RCA’s announcement elicited an immediate response from firms around the world. Liquid research programs in the US, Europe and Japan were commenced, or reinvigorated, as a result of the RCA announcement. The case study now turns attention to some of these other critical parties.

Other players in LCD research

The development and availability of room temperature, stable liquid crystals were identified as a clear obstacle to the further development (Kawamoto 2002). First, however a critical advance was to emerge from another US researcher, James Ferguson at Kent State University in Ohio.
Kent State and the Liquid Crystal Institute

Kent State University in Ohio established the Liquid Crystal Institute (details on the funding) in 1965 under the directorship of Dr. Glenn H. Brown, author of the critical 1958 paper on liquid crystals (Kent State University 2009). The Institute started with one graduate student and $21,000 in annual funding (Neubert 1995). The Institute held the first International Conference on liquid crystal research in 1965. The Institute was supported by grants from the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and U.S. defence agencies.

James Ferguson\(^\text{10}\) who was researching liquid crystals at Westinghouse, initially for use as thermal sensors, was heavily influenced by the RCA 1968 announcement and Richard Williams’ work. Ferguson switched his attention to displays. When Westinghouse stated they were not interested in display applications, considering them to be outside of their core offering (heavy electrical equipment) Ferguson joined the Liquid Crystal Institute at Kent State University\(^\text{11}\).

Ferguson was not to remain at Kent State for long, the late 1960’s university campus was politically active and “industrial applications” were dirty words (Johnstone 1999)\(^\text{12}\) particularly if they were sponsored by US defence agencies, as was the case for his work. However the research Ferguson was conducting during his time at Kent State would become one of the turning point advances in liquid crystal display technology – the twisted nematic structure. The twisted nematic structure refers to the orientation of the liquid crystals, by rubbing the glass in which the liquid crystals are sandwiched between, one of the sheets of glass is then ‘twisted’ 90 degrees, so the LC molecules form a helix, and light can be switched on and off through twisting around the helix (Johnstone 1999).

Ferguson left Kent State after a shooting incident at the university (see note 12) and founded a start-up company – ILIXCO. He had already completed and documented his experiments regarding the

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\(^{10}\) James Ferguson first started working with liquid crystals at Westinghouse Research Laboratories in Pittsburgh, using LC for temperature sensors which had some initial applications in breast cancer diagnosis. After Westinghouse were not interested in progressing LCD research, Ferguson moved to the new Liquid Crystal Institute at Kent State University. He left Kent State in 1970 to found a start-up company ILIXCO to develop TN LCs for digital watches. Ferguson has over 500 patents in the LC field.

\(^{11}\) Westinghouse was also to turn down another major technological advance in LCD, researcher T. Peter Brody built the first active matrix driven LCD, but this would be commercialised by Japanese firms.

\(^{12}\) Kent State University was the site of the 4\(^\text{th}\) May 1970 shooting of students by the Ohio National Guard – 4 died and 9 were injured. Students were protesting about the Vietnam War, particularly the recently announced incursion of US troops into Cambodia, announced by President Nixon on the 30\(^\text{th}\) April 1970.
twisted nematic (TN) LCD structure, whilst at Kent State University. He did not file a patent application for the TN discovery until February 1971. This marked a controversial occasion in LCD development. Two researchers Wolfgang Helfrich and Martin Schadt at Hoffman La Roche in Basel, Switzerland filed a patent application for the TN LCD structure with the Swiss patent office in December 1970. They published their research in a paper in *Applied Physical Letters* four days later. Ferguson’s delay in applying for a patent, despite his detailed record keeping of his experiments dating back to 1969 led to an extensive legal fight over ownership of the patent. This was complicated further by Kent State University claiming a right to Ferguson’s patent because part of the research was completed when he was still at the University. A legal battle between a multinational and a small start up is always going to be a one-sided affair. The dispute was settled out of court with Hoffman La Roche purchasing Ferguson’s patents. However, according to Ferguson La Roche only made one of the promised two payments, but Ferguson’s company ILIXCO was unable to fund further legal action (Kawamoto 2002).

*The UK Liquid Crystal Programme – new LC materials and reverse tilt, reverse twist discovery*

RCA’s 1968 announcement of LCD was a turning point in the UK liquid crystal research community. As with many other researchers RCA’s announcement showed the potential of what had up until this point been only of interest out of academic curiosity. This is highlighted in the following quote which mentions one of the prominent UK LC researchers George Gray and his research, “This (RCA’s announcement) changed the attitude of the University towards his research (Gray’s). His research became a shining example of collaboration; it was not ‘blue sky’ research any more, but its success owed everything to the earlier ‘blue sky’ research on materials, before devices were conceived” (Kawamoto 2002, p.478).

Although the RCA announcement was a boost for LC research globally, a more specific issue was at the core of the first UK government sponsored LC research program – the high cost of royalties the UK paid to RCA for shadow-mask colour TV tube as recounted in the quote below (Kawamoto 2002). In 1967, the new Minister of State for Technology, John Stonehouse made his first visit to the Royal Radar Establishment (RRE), the technology research arm of the British Armed Forces at Malvern UK.

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13 Wolfgang Helfrich had immediately prior to his work at Hoffman La Roche, been employed at RCA in the LC team. He acknowledged that much of the thinking for his TN work occurred at the time when he was located at RCA, who at the time where winding down their LCD program, but it was only when he started work with Martin Schadt that they put the concept together.

14 Shortly after Stonehouse initiated the LC research program, his clothes were found on a beach in California. He was considered to have committed suicide by drowning, only later to be discovered living with his former
“His conversation with RRE Director George MacFarlane ranged over many topics including the financial returns from inventions. MacFarlane pointed out that the UK paid royalties to RCA on the shadow mask colour TV tube which were more than the development costs of the Concorde. Early the next morning, he (Stonehouse) rang the director saying he was convinced that the UK should mount a program to invent a solid-state alternative to the shadow mask tube” (Kawamoto 2002, p.478).

At the Minister’s insistence a working party into solid state research was established. The director of this program was Cyril Hilsum. He was determined that any flat panel display research program should included LCD research. The flat panel display working party supported research on LEDs, electroluminescence and LCDs. Two years later a consortium program was established for firms interested in making and using liquid crystals. Prof George Gray at the University of Hull was offered a two-year contract with the Ministry of Defence to work on “substances exhibiting liquid-crystal states at room temperature” with a budget of £2177 per annum (Kawamoto 2002). The Hull/RRE program started in 1970 with Prof Gray and one post doctoral student, and quickly expanded to include two other scientists, Peter Raynes and Ken Harrison, who were based at the Royal Signals Research Establishment (RSRE) at Malvern.

Gray’s work at Hull was focused on developing new liquid crystal materials and while Raynes’ work theorised about important elements of liquid crystals in the TN structure. Raynes work lead to two important discoveries that increased the effectiveness of how the TN structure works; the reverse twist and reverse tilt. Raynes designed a solution to correct the twist and tilt (which had the effect of

15 Cyril Hilsum was born in 1925. He completed his B.Sci at university College London in 1945, and then joined the Royal Naval Scientific Service. He moved to the Admiralty Research Lab in 1947, then to the Services Electronic Research Lab in 1950 and then the Royal Radar Establishment in 1963, where he remained for twenty years. In 1983 he was made Director of Research at GEC Hirst Research Centre. His time at military R&D labs, Hilsum was credited with supporting LCD research in the UK and bringing in £100m in government support over the three decades of LCD development. The British Liquid Crystal Society awards the Cyril Hilsum medal annually to the British candidates for overall contributions to liquid crystal science and technology.

16 Cliff Jones, interview with author June 2009.

17 RSRE, initially the Royal Radar Establishment and founded in 1953, it merged with the Signals Research and Radar Establishment in 1976 to form the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment. This in turn became the Defence Research Agency (DRA) in 1991. IN 2001 DRA was split into two organisations; a government agency – the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and a company later privatised, called QinetiQ. QinetiQ went on to complete new research into zenith bi-stable liquid crystals.
increasing the contrast of a display), as well as an equation which predicted the necessary properties of the LC mixture.

These discoveries were critical to the success of liquid crystals as a display technology. Together with the new LC materials (cyanobiphenyls) being synthesized by Gray and his team at Hull, genuinely made liquid crystal displays a viable commercial prospect. “Hull and RRE were conscious that they had control of something with commercial value. The consortium documents were immediately marked ‘commercial-in-confidence’ and code words were issued to describe the materials (Kawamoto 2002).

In 1972 the Hull/RRE research team took the first steps towards commercialising their research. Members of the research consortium were keen to access the new cyanobiphenyls developed by the Hull team and demand soon outstripped their ability to produce them. The British Drug House (BDH) was approached to manufacture the compounds under licence for the research program. BDH agreed and delivered their first sample in early 1973. As with many research and development programs, the operation of the liquid crystal materials in the lab differed to that when commercial production quantities were involved. BDH, and particularly Ben Sturgeon, worked at the materials and made improvements that increased their effectiveness and made them more manufacturable.

Even with this external manufacturing arrangement demand from consortium members for the new liquid crystal materials increased rapidly. Soon BDH was struggling to keep up with orders from the consortium for materials as well as approaches from several other manufacturers to produce the chemicals under licence. The situation was complicated further in September 1973 when BDH was sold by its parent company Glaxo to the German firm to E. Merck of Darmstadt. The Ministry of Defence was immediately concerned that BDH sale to Merck would jeopardise the LC research and its commercial production. Merck had its own LC research group and sold their own LC compounds. Despite these concerns it was market difficulties rather than issues with new parent company Merck that plagued BHD.

Despite the demand for materials from the consortium partners, actual sales did not proceed as expected. Many of the international display manufacturers that were producing LCDs had specific processes relating to their mixtures and they were reluctant to change, hoping that they themselves could resolve the deficiencies with their own mixtures rather than buy in new ones and have to

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18 Cliff Jones, interview with author June 2009.
change all the other associated manufacturing processes. In the first six months only 150g were sold in the USA and slightly less in Japan. One scientist noted, “Ironically persuading people to buy something clearly superior to anything they had used previously seemed very difficult. For the scientists the commercial world was most strange” (Kawamoto 2002, p481).

The focus of the RRE/ Hull team turned from discovery and development of the liquid crystal materials to supporting the marketing effort of BDH in selling the materials. The sales team at BDH was not familiar with the physics problems presented by LCD (Kawamoto 2002). By this time the focus of the LCD market had moved from the US to Japan, therefore securing the Japanese market was critical. By 1975 Sharp was using the cyanobiphenyls signing an agreement to purchase 1 tonne of the materials per annum. The following year they introduced a pocket calculator based on cyanobiphenyls in the TN mode. Seiko soon followed suit using the materials in their digital watches. Despite a slow start with establishing market traction and developing the reputation of their LCD materials by 1977 BDH was the largest manufacturer of LC materials in the world and biphenyls were their best selling product. The cyanobiphenyls were also licensed by the UK MoD to Merck in Germany (despite their initial concerns) and Hoffman La Roche in Switzerland. BDH’s leadership position in the market for LC material was to be short lived; the cyanobiphenyls were soon displaced by LC materials developed by Merck.

**Super-twisted effects**

The twisted nematic patent was owned by Swiss firm Hoffman La Roche. They were working in partnership with Brown Boveri and Company (BBC) who had an active liquid crystal research program. In 1978 researchers at BBC developed the ‘supertwisted bi-refringement effect’ LCDs, which became known as the STN-LCDs (Castellano 2004).

At the same time Peter Raynes, Colin Waters and V. Brimbell from RSRE were also investigating super twisted structures, initially for the ‘Guest-Host’ effect (discovered by Heilmeier at RCA) which they completed and patented in 1982. At which time they also noted that this super twisted effect was a big success for BBC, but they were not to remain in the LCD market for long. They exited the LCD business in 1984, apparently “scared off by the size of the opportunity” (Castellano 2004, p.151). They sold their interest in Videlec, the joint LCD manufacturing company that it formed with Philips in 1980.

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19 The twisted nematic and super-twisted LCDs were a big success for BBC, but they were not to remain in the LCD market for long. They exited the LCD business in 1984, apparently “scared off by the size of the opportunity” (Castellano 2004, p.151). They sold their interest in Videlec, the joint LCD manufacturing company that it formed with Philips in 1980.

20 Super twisted nematic displays are a type of monochrome passive matrix LCD. They have more contrast than a TN display. This is achieved by twisting the liquid crystal molecules from 180 to 270 degrees. STN-LCDs require less power, are less expensive to manufacture than TFT-LCDs, although they have poorer image control and refresh speeds lower than TFT driven LCDs.
could be applied to nematic structures as well. The UK work predates the Swiss work by some 12 months; BBC applied for their patent in 1983. Controversy erupted over which team should be credited for the initial discovery of the super twisted effect.

Castellano (2004) and other cite the BBC team as the inventors because they came up with the first practical working device (Castellano 2004, p.151). Indeed BBC researcher Terry J Scheffer, was awarded the Society for Information Display’s ‘Jan Rajchman prize’ in 1993 for the STN-LCD. However the RSRE super twisted effect patent by Raynes, Waters and Brimmell is the largest royalty generating single patent for the UK government 21, suggesting that the intellectual property leadership came from the UK.

Merck and the development of phenyl cyclohexanes
Merck has been involved with LC since 1907, but again it was the RCA announcement in 1968 that kicked things off for Merck as well. Merck, being a pharmaceutical company was interested in the LC compounds and in 1970 they produced room-temperature LC mixtures for display applications. A decisive breakthrough came in 1976 with the synthesis of a new LC family – phenyl cyclohexanes. These were similar to the cyanobiphenyls that were being made by BDH (which Merck acquired in 1970) but these materials were superior in that they had a lower viscosity (rapid time response) and smaller birefringent effects. These materials were used in TN mode LCD and later in active matrix TFT displays.

In the 1990s Merck would again develop a further family of liquid crystal materials with faster response times. These new materials would maintain Merck’s position within the market for liquid crystal materials in the commercialisation of active-matrix LCDs.

The development and production of these liquid crystal materials meant that Merck was one of the few companies to truly profit from the LCD revolution. Cut throat competition in consumer electronics and economies of scale increasing the size and scale of display production meant that although display manufacturers invested billions in plants and employed thousands of people, actual profits were relatively small in terms of the scale and risk of investment. Merck as a component manufacturer and also 3M (manufacturer of specialist polarised films for the LCD glass panels) were

21 Cliff Jones, interview with the author June 2009.
protected from this end consumer competition and had dominance in their respective component manufacturing, allowing them to profit\textsuperscript{22}.

First wave of commercialisation – Calculators and Digital Watches

The first mass market application of liquid crystal display technology was the electronic calculator. As has already been noted the 1968 RCA announced of the LCD progress had spurred many other competitors into LC activities or increased company’s focus on their current activities. The Japanese watch manufacturer Suwa Seikoswa\textsuperscript{23} was one of the first firms to negotiate licences to use RCA technology.

With the advances both in the TN structure and the liquid crystal materials, commercialisation of LC into applications progressed quickly in two areas; pocket calculators and digital watches. In both cases it was Japanese firms who were at the forefront in bringing these products to market.

RCA, despite playing a major role in establishing the early technological base of LCDs and ensuring it captured the display industry’s imagination faced a major decision with regard to its continuing participation in research and development on liquid crystal displays. RCA held the dominant market position in cathode ray tubes (CRT) and had major investments in silicon based technologies. RCA’s commitment to LCDs had up until this point in time focused on research, and much of this government sponsored research (through DoD, Navy, Air Force). In order to develop a product, serious resources would need to be committed to develop pilot manufacturing capability.

The reasons for RCA’s reluctance to continue in the LCD arena are varied. Some members of the RCA LCD research team noted that management was worried about LCD potentially taking revenue away from the CRT market. According to Heilmeier “The people who were asked to commercialise (the technology) saw it as a distraction to their main electronic focus (CRT)” (Wall Street Jour. 1993)

Others acknowledged that they simply did not have the resources that full commercial applications would demand to put into the research. Richard Williams, when recalling the early days, has said “If it had continued that work, RCA would have never achieved a commercial success. It had to await

\textsuperscript{22} Cliff Jones, interview with the author, June 2009.

\textsuperscript{23} Suwa Seikosha was an affiliate of Hattori and Co (now Seiko Corporation). The firm developed and launched the first quartz watch launched onto the Japanese market in 1969.
the development of liquid crystal materials and amorphous silicon (a-Si) technologies, both of which were yet to come from Europe. Those developments altogether have taken a quarter of a century” (Kawamoto 2002, p.468).

Executives from Sharp Corporation\(^{24}\) visited RCA labs to examine the LC research and assess its potential for use as a display in a pocket electronic calculator. Sharp Corporation asked RCA to go into production of DSM LCD pocket calculators, even offered to pay for the development, but RCA was only interested in using DSM LCDs for digital watches in partnership with Timex Corporation. If Sharp was to use liquid crystals for their pocket calculator they were going to have to make them, Sharp launched their LCD research program in 1970 (Castellano 2005).

Sharp set up a special team of researchers to develop the pocket calculator – the multidisciplinary team was given 18 months (instead of the usual 3-5 years standard in Sharp for new product development (Johnstone 1999) to develop a working prototype. In April 1973 they completed the project on time, and in May 1973 Sharp launched the Elsi-Mate EL-805 pocket calculator. The calculator was an immediate success and the first commercial application to successfully use a LCD.

**Watches**

In addition to working on calculator products Sharp also considered LCD to be suitable completed for other small area displays – such as those in watches. Light emitting diodes (LED) had been used previously in watch applications but proved disappointing, with high power consumption and users needing to press the LED light to illuminate the watch every time they wanted to look at the time.

Of all of the early LCD applications RCA investigated digital watches in the most detail. They entered into a partnership with Timex to develop a pilot manufacturing of digital watches based on DSM. The partnership did not last long, and RCA exited LCD manufacturing, selling all of their manufacturing assets to Timex. The early 1970s marked the period when the original RCA LCD research team began

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\(^{24}\) Sharp Corporation (originally Hayakawa Metal Industrial Laboratory) was founded in 1912. The firm is one of Japanese oldest consumer goods manufacturing firms. Inventor and founder Tokuji Hayakawa gained commercial success with the invention of the immensely popular mechanical pencil called ‘Ever-Sharp’. The firm was all but destroyed in the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake and only re-established and incorporated in the late 1920s, when development started on Japan’s first domestically produced crystal radio. In the 1950s Hayakawa introduced the first commercial television set under the brand name ‘Sharp’ in acknowledgment the earlier mechanical pencil. In the 1970 Hayakawa resigned from day-to-day operations. In the same year the company reorganised, changing its name to Sharp Corporation and the establishment of Sharp’s massive R&D lab – Tenri. Sharp went on to become the world leading in LCD technology.
to break up. Heilmeier left RCA to become a White House fellow\textsuperscript{25}, Louis Zanoni left to found a start-up Optel Corporation with a number of other RCA researchers to commercialise digital wrist watches (which they achieved in 1971) (Castellano 2005).

The early attempts to manufacture digital watches based on the DSM were not a success; there were reliability issues with the LC materials (they degraded quickly) and the DSM. Commercial success would have to wait for displays based on the twisted nematic (TN) mode. In 1973 Seiko became the first to market with a TN watch when they announced the digital LC watch 06L. These watches were the first commercial success for LC in the watch market. Reliability of the digital watches was increased when the LC cyanobiphenyls from the UK became widely available, “with the TN mode and the cyanobiphenyls the LC watch industry took off” (Kawamoto 2002, p.485).

\textbf{The Active Matrix – The TV on the wall}

The next major technological advance in the LCD industry was concerned with the power supply of the LCDs. The active matrix would bring together LCD with amorphous silicon thin film transistors (TFT). These TFTs would replace the bulky CRT and enable the vision of the ‘TV on the wall’ to be achieved (Florida and Browdy 1994).

The first LCD driven by TFTs was developed by T. Peter Brody\textsuperscript{26} at Westinghouse Research Laboratories in 1972. By this time Westinghouse was one of the only large US corporate still actively pursuing LCD research. RCA was winding its research program down, as were GE, Hughes Aircraft and IBM. Westinghouse’s interest was not to last long, the firm was already feeling the effects of competition on their semiconductor and television businesses. Senior management found the technology development timelines of developing the TFT LCD too long, a management committee decided to end the TFT-LCD program in 1979 (Florida and Browdy 1994)\textsuperscript{27}.

\textsuperscript{25} US Government training scheme for external experts to become White House Advisers

\textsuperscript{26} T. Peter Brody joined Westinghouse Research laboratories in 1959 after completing his PhD in theoretical physics at University College London. Brody spent 12 years developing TFT technology for displays, firstly in electroluminescence, then LCD. Brody left Westinghouse in 1979 when decided against pursuing flat panel displays (Kawamoto 2002). He founded Panelvision in 1981 to commercialise AM LCDs with VC investment. Panelvision was sold to Litton Industries in 1985 by the VC investors.

\textsuperscript{27} In this section I draw on extensively on Florida, R. and D. Browdy (1994). "The invention that got away." Technology Review 94(6).
Brody decided to commercialise TFT-LCD himself, founding Panelvision with $1.5m of investment from 3M and $4m from a group of venture capitalists (Florida and Browdy 1994). This allowed Brody to set up a manufacturing facility. The venture capitalists also installed three new managers to help Brody run the company. The company experienced many of the early difficulties of high technology firms; difficulties in finding the right management team mix, identifying customers and developing suppliers. However by 1984 the firm was selling products and had eighty customers. Panelvision had received a further $13m in venture capital investment over 6 rounds.

Panelvision was having difficulty with achieving profitability. It needed to manufacture on a larger scale to be worthwhile. A plan was devised to set up a large scale manufacturing facility; $5m in development capital was required to build the facility. At the same time the Japanese firm Seiko introduced a colour pocket TV into the US even though they were infringing Westinghouse’s original active matrix patent. This had the effect of scaring the investors who were already weary of putting more money into the firm. Instead the investors decided to recoup their investment; Panelvision was sold to Litton Industries in 1985 who were seeking to develop and use the technology for aircraft cockpit displays.

Brody tried again to commercialise the active matrix LCD, founding a second firm; Magnascreen in 1988 but this again was thwarted by venture capitalists and Japanese competition. In retrospect, venture capital was an unsuitable method for financing a display manufacturing firm. The capital cost to development manufacturing capability that was commercially viable was large, and beyond what a VC would invest into a small start-up.

Second wave of commercialisation – Televisions and Laptops

A number of Japanese firms were also attempting to develop colour LCD driven by a TFT-LCD. Sharp, Daini Seikosha and Seiko Epsom were all conducting research into TFT-LCD. Sharp followed the work of Spear and LeComber at the University of Dundee. The University of Dundee research team developed amorphous silicon semiconductors (Madan 2006). Amorphous silicon was more power efficient and operated at lower temperatures and placed on ordinary glass substrates. In 1981 LeComber demonstrated a TFT 7x5 inch array. In 1982 he visited Sharp in Japan to talk about the

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28 3M were interesting in corporate venturing in LCD because they supplied the industry-leading polarising film for the display’s glass panels.

29 The threat of Japanese competition was cited by a number of firms as a reason for discontinuing their R&D programs and in each case does not seem to be based on empirical evidence.

30 Dani Seikosha and Seiko Epsom were both Subsidiaries of Hattori & Co (later Sharp Corporation in 1983)
amorphous silicon technology, primarily to discuss its application to solar cells but the link to LCD was quickly made (Kawamoto 2002). Sharp quickly incorporated the technology into their work on TFT LCDs. Sharp announced the first 14-inch TFT LCD unit in June 1988. The TV on the wall was now a reality. In regards to this announcement Heilmeier was quoted in the Wall Street Journal, “I think you need to give the credit to the people who preserved and worked on LCDs for 25 years” (Wall Street Journal 1993).

The same technology would be integrated into portable laptop computers. With no US based LCD manufacturers US computer companies entered into production arrangements with Japanese manufacturers, Hoshiden made screens for Macintosh, Sharp for Texas Instruments and Toshiba Display technology for IBM (Florida and Browdy 1994).

Third wave of commercialisation – Large area displays

The next wave of commercialisation of LCD applications was around increasing the size of the displays. This required innovations in materials, manufacturing techniques and glass substrates, “Subsequent R&D has been focused on scaling the characteristic parameters of panel size, picture resolution, viewing angle, colour capabilities, weight, power consumption, ruggedness and manufacturing costs” (Stolpe 2002).

The early 1990s marked the start of this period of development of large screen displays. Large area displays now dominate the LCD industry. Japan enjoyed an early dominance in this market as well, with 95% of market share in the high volume, large format display industry in 1990 (Asakawa 2007). Japan’s dominance has since reduced, currently it accounts for about 15% of the market with Taiwan and South Korea accounting for 40% each (Asakawa 2007).

There are various reasons used to explain Japan’s decreasing market share of the large format LCD market. One of the most prominent is the Japanese recession in the early 1990s (which allowed South Korea into the market) and the Asian financial crisis in 1998 (which allowed Taiwan to enter the market) (Hu 2008). Both South Korea and Taiwan’s entered into the large format LCD manufacturing industry with the assistance of Government programs aimed at ‘catching up’. The most critical aspect of government support in these countries was financial support in setting up fabrication plants in Korea and Taiwan, rather than the assistance in knowledge transfer (Hu 2008). Japanese firms had well-established links with Taiwanese firms; Japan is the main source of foreign director investors into Taiwan in electronics, precision machinery and automotive industries (Wang 2006). This suggests that good knowledge transfer options already existed in the case of Taiwan.
Ongoing work in bi-stable passive matrix LCDs

Televisions and laptop computers rely on active matrix power supply driven by TFTs. The discussion on super twisted LCD effects highlight a group of passive matrix LCDs that had lower power consumption and manufacturing costs, but poorer image control and refresh speeds that TFT driven LCDs.

Passive matrix displays are not suitable for TVs and laptops as the images changes too frequently for the benefits to outweigh the disadvantages, but for displays where image control and high refresh speed are not priorities, passive matrix displays are ideal. Such applications include signage, screens and labelling.

DRA, the defence research agency in the UK, continued ongoing research into these types of bi-stable passive matrix LCDs through the 1990s. The research was largely funded by the royalty revenue from the STN patent. A major development was the discovery of zenithal bi-stable nematic LCDs. These displays use grated instead of rubbed layers on the glass substrate containing the liquid crystal material (Jones 2007). The technology was patented in 1995 with the first prototype devices developed in 1997. The technology is currently being commercialised by ZBD Solutions, a spin out from DRA in 2000\(^{31}\), just prior to DRA’s split into a government agency and a private company QinetiQ.

ZBD solutions products are zenith bi-stable LCD for retail pricing labels. They are currently in final customer trials in different retail environments across Europe. The company has been funded by a consortium of UK venture capital funds including TTP Ventures and dfj esprit as well as from corporate sources; Dow Chemical Group and QinetiQ.

Conclusions

This paper has presented a case study of the development of liquid crystal display technology. The study focuses on the early technological development of LCDs in R&D laboratories in the US, primarily RCA. Much of this work was supported by military R&D contracts and the resources of (then) the US top corporations. Yet the US failed to capitalise in terms of industrial employment and

\(^{31}\) ZBD Solutions spun out with much of the technical team involved in the zenith bi-stable LCD program. In an interview with Cliff Jones, Director of R&D, he commented that ZBD Solutions may be the first civil service spin out company. The founding team had many difficulties in negotiating IP and equity stakes in the new spin out company because of their civil service status.
exports, on the early scientific investments. This pattern was repeated again in the 1980s with the development of the active matrix driven LCDs.

The UK government also invested in the development of liquid crystal materials in the 1960s and 1970s. This led to a dominant position in the global supply of liquid crystal materials and the creation of key intellectual property relating to twisted and super twisted nematic structures. The global position in materials was overtaken by another European counterpart (and eventual parent company of the UK firm) Merck; who along with 3M have truly profited from the LCD revolution with their provision of superior quality (in comparison to competitors) component supply.

The UK LCD industry was primarily focused on military customers; highly specialised applications, low production quantities and high per unit costs. This meant that the UK LCD industry was never in a competitive position to enter the consumer electronics market. Whether we can call this a failure of UK technological commercialisation is difficult to say, when success in the consumer markets was never the aim of the UK research programs, rather superior military applications, which were delivered. The UK situation highlights the effect of national research program context, particularly government sponsored research, on the eventually commercial outcomes of the research.

Japanese firms were the most successful in commercialising LCDs in the first and second waves of commercialisation (calculators, watches, TV and laptops). It is only recently, and in the third wave of LCD commercialisation, in large format displays, that Japan’s position in manufacturing has been overtaken; by South Korea and Taiwan. Financial crises in Japan (recession and the Asian Financial crisis) allowed time for both these countries in turn to enter the large format LCD manufacturing market, and develop a stake. The success of Korean and Taiwanese firm to achieve this is attributed more to government support in accessing large amounts of financial capital rather than in supporting direct knowledge transfer. “The main benefit to date from innovative activity in this industry has probably been captured by firms and workers in Japan, Korea and Taiwan” (Hart 2008).

The case study highlights the long development trajectory of the LCD industry; twenty-five years plus from initial technological discovery to the commercialisation of the third wave LCDs (large format LCDs). All the decisions about technological development were made without the full knowledge of where the industry would ultimately capitalise on these advances. Government support was also provided in this context.
“The history of LCDs is a story of hard work, disappointments, and successes of worldwide competition and cooperation that encompassed the US, Europe and Japan. Each industrial centre contributed its particular strengths; in America, it was the quickness of forming new ideas and demonstrating their feasibility; in Europe, it was the fundamental science and synthesis of basic materials; and in Japan, it was the process of perfecting implementation and moving it to the production line” (Kawamoto 2002 p.461)
Table 1 – Top patent holders in LCD 1970-2008

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<td>Xerox Corporation</td>
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<td>L.G. Philips Co. Ltd.</td>
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<td>Semiconductor Energy Lab Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Seiko Epson Corporation</td>
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<td>Nitto Denko Corporation</td>
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<td>Hannstar Display Corporation</td>
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References


